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Phone acts as wireless smart card -- walk up to terminal, session appears; walk away, session suspends. No insertion, works from pocket. - BLE beacon with encrypted rotating session token - RSSI-based proximity detection with configurable thresholds - Anti-flapping timers: T_attach (2s) and T_detach (10s) - Security: HMAC timestamps, token rotation, optional NFC tap - Companion app (Android/iOS): one-time OIDC setup, background BLE - Implements same TokenProvider trait as smart cards (ADR-004) - NFC as explicit complement, WiFi/mDNS as software fallback
199 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
199 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-013: Smartphone as Proximity Token
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## Status
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Accepted
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## Context
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SunRay's session mobility was driven by smart card insertion/removal. WayRay supports pluggable tokens (ADR-004). A smartphone is the one device users always carry. If the phone can act as a proximity token, we get automatic session follow without any explicit action -- walk up to a terminal, your desktop appears; walk away, it suspends.
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This maps directly to SunRay's smart card semantics:
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- Smart card insert → phone enters proximity range
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- Smart card remove → phone leaves proximity range
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But better: no physical insertion, works from your pocket.
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## Technology Options
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### BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) -- Recommended
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The phone runs a small companion app that broadcasts a BLE advertisement containing a session token. The WayRay client has a BLE receiver that detects nearby phones.
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**How BLE beacons work:**
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- Phone advertises a BLE beacon with a service UUID specific to WayRay
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- The advertisement payload contains an encrypted session token (≤31 bytes in legacy advertising, ≤255 bytes in extended)
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- The client scans for WayRay beacons and reads the token
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- RSSI (signal strength) determines proximity -- configurable threshold
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- When RSSI drops below threshold (user walked away), trigger disconnect
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**Advantages:**
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- Always-on: phone advertises in background, no user action needed
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- Works from pocket (no need to pull phone out)
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- Range tunable via RSSI threshold (1-10 meters typical)
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- Low power: BLE advertising uses ~1-5% battery per day
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- Universal: every modern smartphone has BLE
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- Works through walls at close range (meeting rooms)
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**BLE Token Flow:**
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```
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Phone (companion app):
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1. User authenticates in app once (OIDC, biometric, etc.)
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2. App receives signed session token from IdP/server
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3. App begins BLE advertising:
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Service UUID: WayRay-specific
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Payload: encrypted(token_id + timestamp + HMAC)
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4. Rotates payload periodically (replay prevention)
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WayRay Client (BLE scanner):
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1. Continuously scans for WayRay service UUID
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2. Detects beacon → reads token → validates HMAC + timestamp
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3. If new token in range: trigger session attach
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4. If token leaves range (RSSI below threshold for N seconds):
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trigger session detach
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5. If multiple tokens: nearest (highest RSSI) wins
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```
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### NFC -- Complementary
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Phone tap on NFC reader for explicit authentication:
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- Quick deliberate action (tap to connect)
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- Works as fallback when BLE is disabled
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- Can trigger initial token provisioning
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- Very short range (~4cm) -- no proximity tracking
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### UWB (Ultra-Wideband) -- Future
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Precise distance measurement (10cm accuracy):
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- iPhone U1/U2 chip, some Samsung/Google phones
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- Could enable "desk assignment" -- know exactly which terminal you're closest to
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- Not yet universal enough to depend on
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- Consider as enhancement when hardware penetration increases
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### WiFi Proximity (mDNS) -- Fallback
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Phone app announces presence on local network:
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- Works without BLE hardware on client
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- Coarse proximity (same VLAN/subnet)
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- Higher latency (mDNS discovery takes seconds)
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- Can't distinguish between terminals in the same room
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- Useful as a fallback when BLE isn't available
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## Decision
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**BLE as primary proximity mechanism, NFC as explicit-action complement, WiFi/mDNS as software-only fallback.**
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### Proximity State Machine
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```
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BLE beacon detected
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(RSSI > threshold)
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[No Phone] ─────────────────────────────────> [Detected]
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│
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│ stable for
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│ T_attach seconds
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v
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┌──────────────────────────── [Attached]
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│ │
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│ BLE beacon returns │ RSSI < threshold
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│ (RSSI > threshold) │ for T_detach seconds
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│ v
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└──────────────────────────── [Detaching]
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│
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│ timeout expires
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v
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[Detached]
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│
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│ (session suspends)
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v
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[No Phone]
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```
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**Timers prevent flapping:**
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- `T_attach`: delay before attaching (default: 2 seconds). Prevents drive-by session grabs when walking past a terminal.
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- `T_detach`: delay before detaching (default: 10 seconds). Prevents session drop when phone briefly loses signal (body shielding, phone rotates in pocket).
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- Both configurable per-deployment.
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### Security Considerations
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**Replay attacks:** Token payload includes a timestamp and HMAC. Client rejects tokens older than N seconds. Phone rotates payload every 30 seconds.
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**Relay attacks:** An attacker could relay the BLE signal from a distant phone to a nearby client. Mitigations:
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- Token payload includes a challenge-response nonce (requires phone app to respond)
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- RSSI-based distance bounding (relayed signals have abnormal RSSI patterns)
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- Optional: require NFC tap for initial session attachment, BLE only for persistence
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- For high-security deployments: disable BLE proximity, use smart card only
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**Token theft:** If someone clones the BLE advertisement, they get the session token. Mitigations:
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- Token rotation (new token every 30s, phone signs each one)
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- Mutual authentication: client challenges phone via BLE GATT connection
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- Binding token to phone's hardware attestation key (Android SafetyNet / iOS DeviceCheck)
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**Multi-phone scenarios:** When multiple phones are near a terminal:
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- Highest RSSI wins (closest phone)
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- If tie: first-arrived wins
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- Explicit NFC tap overrides BLE proximity (deliberate action beats passive detection)
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### Hardware Requirements
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**Client side:**
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- BLE 4.0+ receiver (USB dongle or built-in)
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- Optional: NFC reader (USB)
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- Commodity hardware: USB BLE dongles cost ~$5-10
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**Phone side:**
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- Companion app (Android + iOS)
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- BLE 4.0+ (every phone since ~2013)
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- Background execution permission for BLE advertising
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### Implementation as Auth Plugin
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```rust
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struct BleProximityPlugin {
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scanner: BleScanner,
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known_tokens: HashMap<TokenId, ProximityState>,
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rssi_threshold: i8, // e.g., -70 dBm
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attach_delay: Duration, // e.g., 2 seconds
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detach_delay: Duration, // e.g., 10 seconds
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}
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impl TokenProvider for BleProximityPlugin {
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fn watch(&self) -> TokenEventStream {
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// Emits:
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// TokenInserted(token_id) -- phone entered proximity
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// TokenRemoved(token_id) -- phone left proximity
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}
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}
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```
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This implements the same `TokenProvider` trait as smart cards (ADR-004). The session management layer doesn't know or care whether the token came from a smart card slot or a BLE beacon.
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### Companion App Scope
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The phone app is intentionally minimal:
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1. One-time setup: authenticate with IdP (OIDC), receive signing key
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2. Background service: broadcast BLE beacon with rotating signed token
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3. Optional: respond to GATT challenges for mutual auth
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4. Optional: show notification when session attaches/detaches
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5. No remote desktop functionality -- the phone is a **key**, not a viewer
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Platform:
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- Android: foreground service with BLE advertising
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- iOS: Core Bluetooth peripheral mode (works in background with limitations)
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- Could be a PWA using Web Bluetooth (limited background support)
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## Rationale
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- **Zero-friction session mobility**: walk up, session appears. Walk away, session suspends. No card to insert, no button to press, no QR to scan.
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- **Users already carry phones**: unlike smart cards which are an additional device to manage and can be forgotten
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- **Maps to SunRay semantics**: insert/remove maps to enter/leave proximity. Same session management, different physical mechanism.
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- **Pluggable**: implements `TokenProvider` trait. Composable with other token types. Smart card overrides BLE on explicit insertion.
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- **Tunable security/convenience tradeoff**: high security deployments add NFC tap requirement or disable BLE entirely. Casual deployments use pure proximity.
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## Consequences
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- Requires BLE hardware on client devices (USB dongle if not built-in)
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- Must develop and maintain companion apps for Android and iOS
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- BLE scanning has power implications on battery-powered clients
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- RSSI is noisy and affected by environment (walls, bodies, interference). Threshold tuning is deployment-specific.
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- iOS background BLE advertising has limitations (Apple throttles frequency)
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- Must handle edge cases: phone in adjacent room, phone dies mid-session, multiple phones
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- Privacy consideration: BLE beacons are detectable by nearby devices. Token payload must be encrypted so only WayRay clients can read the session token.
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